Reflections on the recognition of African customary marriages in South Africa: Seeking insights for the recognition of Muslim marriages by Amien, Waheeda
JOBNAME: Acta Juridica 13 PAGE: 1 SESS: 6 OUTPUT: Mon Nov 25 10:34:53 2013
/dtp22/juta/juta/acta−juridica13/ch17
Reflections on the recognition of African
customary marriages in South Africa:
seeking insights for the recognition of
Muslim marriages
WAHEEDA AMIEN*
In 1998, South Africa enacted the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act
120 of 1998 (RCMA), which for the first time in the history of the country
afforded legal recognition to African customary marriages. The enactment of
this legislation was effected in accordance with section 15(3)(a) of the
Constitution of South Africa 1996. Through the same constitutional provi-
sion, the South African government proposes to enact legislation to afford
legal recognition to Muslim marriages. The draft legislation recommending
the recognition and regulation of Muslim marriages is known as the Muslim
Marriages Bill (MMB). The MMB has generated a fair amount of controversy
within the South African Muslim community and broader civil society.
In this paper, I undertake a comparative analysis of the RCMA and MMB
with the specific aim of deriving lessons from the recognition of African
customary marriages for the recognition of Muslim marriages. A reflection on
the manner in which African customary marriages have been recognised and
regulated reveals that the approach considered for the recognition and
regulation of Muslim marriages must be impact-focused and context-driven.
In particular, to advance constitutional rights and norms, I show that attention
must be paid to the position of marginalised and vulnerable groups within the
Muslim community, including women and children. At the same time, I
demonstrate that in drafting legislation to recognise Muslim marriages, many
competing interests are at play. As such, it may be necessary to entertain
reasonable compromises to ensure that the legislation is enacted and that it
contains the potential to safeguard the rights of the more marginalised
members of the Muslim community.
I INTRODUCTION
For the past several years, my research has focused primarily on the human
rights implications of Muslim marriages operating at the non-state level in
South Africa. It has also considered the manner in which Muslim
marriages should be afforded official or legal recognition within the state
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sphere and the human rights implications that may arise from such
recognition.1
Thus far, my discussions relating to the legal recognition of Muslim
marriages have not taken cognisance of the research undertaken in respect
of African customary marriages. In South Africa, the latter have enjoyed
legal recognition for the past 13 years. It is my belief that a reflection on
the manner in which African customary marriages have been afforded
legal recognition in South Africa and the gendered implications of that
recognition can potentially generate significant lessons for the legal
recognition of Muslim marriages (and perhaps other religious marriages
that also do not currently enjoy legal recognition, such as Hindu and
Jewish marriages).
In this paper, I therefore reflect on the South African experience in
recognising African customary marriages for the purpose of deriving
insights for the legal recognition of Muslim marriages. Due to space
constraints, I do not discuss case law relating to African customary
marriages or Muslim marriages. I also do not consider the implications of
establishing traditional courts and Sharî’a (Islamic law) courts. Instead, I
concentrate on the implications of enacting the Recognition of Custom-
ary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (RCMA) and the proposed enactment of
the Muslim Marriages Bill (MMB).2 The paper presents a comparative
analysis of the RCMA and MMB, but specifically for the purpose of
ascertaining what lessons, if any, can be derived from the enactment of the
one (RCMA) for the other (MMB).
The paper comprises six parts. It commences in Part 2 with an outline
of the historical context for the enactment of the RCMA and the
proposed enactment of the MMB. This is followed in Part 3 with a
discussion of the regulation of African customary marriages. Thereafter,
Part 4 deals with the proposed regulation of Muslim marriages followed
by Part 5, which extracts the lessons derived from the comparative study.
Finally, concluding remarks are captured in Part 6.
II HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Under colonial and apartheid rule in South Africa, the customary family
laws of indigenous African communities, which comprise the over-
1 W Amien ‘Overcoming the conflict between the right to religious freedom and women’s
rights to equality – a South African case study of Muslim marriages’ (2006) 28 Human Rights
Quarterly 729–754; W Amien ‘A South African case study for the recognition and regulation of
Muslim family law in a minority Muslim secular context’ (2010) 24(3) International Journal of
Law, Policy and the Family 361–396.
2 Available at http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/bills/2010_muslim-marriages-bill.pdf,
accessed 23 May 2013.
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whelming majority of the total population of South Africa,3 and religious
family laws of minority religious communities including the Muslim
community,4 were marginalised. While African customary marriages
received partial recognition,5 Muslim marriages did not receive any
recognition.6 In fact, since the seventeenth century when Muslims were
first brought to South Africa from various parts of South Asia, South-East
Asia andAfrica as slaves, political prisoners, convicts, indentured labourers
and traders,7 they were prohibited from practising or propagating Islam in
public – a crime that was punishable by death.8 They therefore practised
their religion in private and regulated their religious family laws within
the private sphere as well. Given their origins, most South African
Muslims were classified either ‘Indian’ or ‘Coloured’ under the apartheid
dispensation and were therefore also subject to racial discrimination.9
Most South African Muslims are today still located within those histori-
cally disadvantaged communities.
Muslim marriages have not yet been afforded legal recognition, thus
South African Muslims continue to conclude nikahs (Muslim marriage
ceremonies) within the non-state domain and to regulate Muslim family
law themselves. Since the majority of South African Muslims follow the
Sunni tradition, regulation of Muslim family law within most South
African Muslim communities is informed by Sunni laws.10
The refusal to fully recognise African customary marriages and Muslim
marriages stemmed from a colonial and Nationalist Party11 perspective
3 According to Census 2011 results, indigenous Africans comprised 79.4 per cent of South
Africa’s total population of 51 490 025; see http://www.info.gov.za/aboutsa/people.htm,
accessed 28 May 2013.
4 According to Census 2001, Muslims comprised about 1.5 per cent of South Africa’s total
population of 44 819 778; see http://www.info.gov.za/aboutsa/people.htm, accessed 28 May
2013.
5 Prior to 2000, customary marriages were recognised only in certain parts of KwaZulu-
Natal (through the KwaZuluAct on the Code of Zulu Law 16 of 1985) and the former Transkei
(through the Transkei Marriage Act 21 of 1978). Women’s Legal Centre Recognition of
Customary Marriages (2011) at 5; M Mamashela ‘New families, new property, new laws: the
practical effects of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 616–641 at
617.
6 Bronn v Frits Bronn’s Executors and Others 1860 3 Searle 313; Seedat’s Executors v The Master
(Natal) 1917 AD 302; Estate Mehta v Acting Master, High Court 1958 (4) SA 252 (FC); Kader v
Kader 1972 (3) SA 203 (R, AD); Ismail v Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (AD).
7 E Moosa ‘The dilemma of Islamic rights schemes’ (2000–2001) 15 Journal of Law and
Religion 185–215 at 211.
8 GJ van Niekerk ‘Legal pluralism’ in JC Bekker, C Rautenbach and NMI Goolam (eds)
Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa (2006) 8–9.
9 F Cachalia ‘Citizenship, Muslim family law and a future South African constitution: a
preliminary enquiry’ (1993) 56 THRHR 392–413 at 397.
10 Amien HRQ (n 1) at 731.
11 The Nationalist Party assumed power in South Africa in 1948 when it introduced
apartheid and ruled the country until 1993; see http://www.sahistory.org.za/np-ascendancy-
and-apartheid-1939–1950s and http://www.sahistory.org.za/regime-unravels-1985-1991,
accessed 15 June 2013.
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that the western Christian understanding of marriage should inform the
requirements for a valid marriage, which included monogamy.12 This
resulted in a legal approach that regarded potentially polygynous mar-
riages, such as African customary marriages and Muslim marriages as
contrary to public policy.13 African customary marriages were further
considered contrary to public policy because they included the practice of
lobolo (bridewealth),14 which was also not inherent to Christian mar-
riages.15 Thus, as Felicity Kaganas and Christina Murray observed, ‘[pre-
1994] South African family law . . . privilege[d] one type of family and
reluctantly [gave] second class status (or no status at all) to others.’16
Nevertheless, Muslims were (and still are) able to enter into civil
marriages in accordance with the Marriage Act 25 of 1961.17 Only in this
way are they able to access the legal consequences of civil marriages,
including community of property, which enables both spouses to benefit
equally from the joint marital estate.18 However, very few Muslims
actually exercise this option due to religious and cultural reasons. First,
many members of the ulamâ (Muslim clergy) discourage members of their
congregation from entering into civil marriages by claiming that those
marriages are unIslamic and therefore harâm (Islamically impermissible).
The reasons for this claim are that a civil marriage would preclude
Muslims from entering into polygynous marriages and would involve a
default in community of property matrimonial property regime. The
latter involves a joint matrimonial estate in which each spouse has a 50 per
cent share. This is in contrast to the default regime under a traditional
understanding of Islamic law, which requires the estates of spouses to be
kept separate at all times. Secondly, it is simply not part of the culture
within South African Muslim communities for Muslims to have civil
marriages in addition to their Muslim marriages. Negative messages from
the ulamâ about the Islamic impermissibility of civil marriages makes the
transformation of that culture into one that is more accepting of civil
marriages quite difficult. Thus, most South African Muslims conclude
marriages that do not have legal protection. As marginalised members of
the Muslim community, women are disproportionately affected by the
12 Bronn supra (n 6) at 318, 320 and 321 (delivered by Hodges CJ) and 333 (delivered by
Watermeyer J, concurring with the decision of the Chief Justice); F Kaganas and C Murray
‘Law, women and the family: the question of polygyny in a new South Africa’ 1991 Acta Juridica
116–134 at 116.
13 Ismail supra (n 6) at 1024D–F.
14 A description of lobolo is provided in the text attached to the following footnotes below
(n 60, 66, 79, 82, 92 and 93).
15 C Dlamini ‘Indigenous law and the Bill of Rights’ in Butterworths Bill of Rights
Compendium (2006) at 6A–11.
16 Kaganas and Murray (n 12) at 116.
17 Section 3.
18 Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984, ch III.
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non-recognition of Muslim marriages. For instance, they are neither able
to challenge Muslim family law rules that discriminate against them, nor
enforce benefits that are recognised for women under Muslim family
law.19
In contrast, indigenous Africans were not permitted to enter into civil
marriages at all and were therefore not able to access the benefits attached
to those marriages. This changed after 1994, so that they now also have
the civil option available to them.20 For those who enter customary
unions only, the post-1994 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act
(RCMA)21 regulates those marriages. The enactment of the RCMA
signalled a significant departure from the colonial and apartheid govern-
ments’ view of African customary marriages as inferior to Christian and
civil marriages. For the first time in South African history, African
customary marriages were afforded a place of pride within the country’s
legal framework and acknowledged as worthy of legal respect and
recognition.22 In fact, African customary law in general, which had
previously been subordinated to colonial and apartheid laws, has post-
1994 been elevated to the same level as common law.23 The only supreme
law that now exists in South Africa is the Constitution, to which all other
laws, including customary law and the common law, are equally subordi-
nate.24
In accordance with s 15(3)(a)(i) of the 1996 South African Constitu-
tion25 and arising from consultations with relevant experts, traditional
leaders, members of the ulamâ, and civil society,26 the ANC-led govern-
ment respectively enacted the RCMA and drafted the Muslim Marriages
19 Amien IJLP (n 1) at 363.
20 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, s 10(1).
21 Ibid. The RCMA came into effect in 2000.
22 P Andrews ‘ ‘‘Big love’’? The recognition of customary marriages in South Africa’ (2007)
64(4) Washington and Lee Law Review 1483–1497 at 1495.
23 Section 211(3) of the Constitution reads: ‘The courts must apply customary law when that
law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with
customary law’. C Himonga and C Bosch ‘The application of African customary law under the
Constitution of South Africa: problems solved or just beginning?’ (2000) 117 SALJ 306–341 at
308; C Himonga ‘The advancement of African women’s rights in the first decade of democracy
in South Africa: the reform of the customary law of marriage and succession’ 2005 Acta Juridica
82–107 at 101; C Himonga ‘African customary law in South Africa – many faces of Bhe v
Magistrate Khayelitsha’ (2005) Recht In Afrika 163–183 at 176.
24 Section 2 of the Constitution declares: ‘This Constitution is the supreme law of the
Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must
be fulfilled.’ Section 8(1) provides: ‘The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the
legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.’
25 Section 15(3)(a)(i) of the Constitution enables the enactment of legislation that recognises
‘marriages concluded under tradition, or a system of religious, personal or family law’.
26 South African Law Commission (Project 90) The Harmonisation of the Common Law and the
Indigenous Law. Report on Customary Marriages (August 1998), available at http://salawreform.
justice.gov.za/reports/r_prj90_cstm_1998aug.pdf, accessed 23 May 2013; South African Law
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Bill (MMB).27 The latter recommends the recognition and comprehen-
sive regulation of Muslim marriages in South Africa. While the RCMA
was passed fairly soon after its consultation processes began, the MMB is
still not enacted despite having been submitted to the Minister of Justice
and Constitutional Development (hereafter referred to as ‘the Minister’)
in 2003 (this version of the Bill hereafter referred to as the ‘2003
MMB’).28 The main reason for the delay appears to be the ulamâ’s
reluctance to accept the second version of the MMB, which was
approved by Cabinet in 2010 (this version of the Bill hereafter referred to
as the ‘2010 MMB’).29
Without official notification or consultation, the Department of Justice
and Constitutional Development (DoJ) amended a few provisions of the
2003 MMB, which caused the moderate (and majority) members of the
ulamâ, who had previously supported the 2003 MMB, to withdraw their
support for the 2010 MMB on the basis that it was no longer compliant
with Islamic law.30 Although most of the provisions of the 2003 MMB are
retained in the 2010 MMB, the few changes that had been effected have
halted the process of legislative recognition of Muslim marriages in South
Africa.
Two provisions in particular have put the proverbial spanner in the
works: First, moderate members of the ulamâ had agreed that a secular
court could adjudicate disputes arising from the MMB, provided they
were presided over by a Muslim judge with Islamic law experts acting as
assessors. This was accordingly incorporated into the 2003 MMB.31
However, those provisos were removed in the 2010 MMB, which
recommends that any secular judge, with or without assessors and
regardless of religious affiliation, can adjudicate MMB-related disputes.32
Secondly, the 2003 MMB required disputes to be subjected to compul-
sory mediation or voluntary arbitration prior to the finalisation of divorce
proceedings. The decisions of mediators and arbitrators would have been
binding and the court would only have been able to overturn that aspect
of the mediation or arbitration order that it considered to not be in the
Reform Commission (Project 59) Islamic Marriages and Related Matters Report, (July 2003),
available at http://salawreform.justice.gov.za/reports/r_prj59_2003jul.pdf, accessed 23 May
2013.
27 See http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/bills/2010_muslim-marriages-bill.pdf, accessed
23 May 2013.
28 I discuss the provisions of the 2003 MMB in greater detail inAmien (n 1 IJLP) at 361–396.
29 See http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/bills/2010_muslim-marriages-bill.pdf, accessed
23 May 2013.
30 United Ulama Council of South Africa UUCSA Update on the Muslim Marriages Bill
(18 March 2011), available at http://www.councilofulama.co.za/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=569:uucsa-update-on-the-muslim-marriages-bill&catid=44:social
&Itemid=61, accessed 1 June 2013.
31 Clause 15, 2003 MMB.
32 Clause 1, 2010 MMB.
362 MARRIAGE, LAND AND CUSTOM
JOBNAME: Acta Juridica 13 PAGE: 7 SESS: 6 OUTPUT: Mon Nov 25 10:34:53 2013
/dtp22/juta/juta/acta−juridica13/ch17
best interests of the children born of the marriage.33 In contrast, the 2010
MMB does not make provision for compulsory mediation or arbitration,
only voluntary mediation.34 Moderate members of the ulamâ envisage the
mediation/arbitration and assessing domains as those areas in which they
would be able to exercise influence over the outcome of MMB-related
disputes. This is the reason that they are conditioning their support for the
2010 MMB on the reinsertion of the requirements for Muslim judges,
Islamic law experts as assessors, and compulsory mediation.
At the other end of the spectrum are those Muslim and secular
extremists – who comprise a minority of dissidents – who reject outright
the notion of a secular state regulating Muslim (or any religious) mar-
riages. Muslim extremists dub the MMB the ‘kufr Bill’,35 thereby convey-
ing the message that any support for the MMB would be considered
harâm. Among the secular extremists are also women’s rights advocates
who are not willing to put up with legislation that is not entirely
consistent with gender equality. They justify their position on the basis of
s 15(3)(b) of the Constitution,36 which requires that legislation recognis-
ing religious and customary marriages must be consistent with provisions
of the Constitution, including gender equality. Thus, Muslim and secular
extremists reject both versions of the MMB.37
Adopting a somewhat more balanced and middle-of-the-road
approach are those secular and Muslim women’s rights advocates who
also acknowledge that both versions of the MMB have provisions that are
problematic from a gendered perspective. Yet, they are willing to tolerate
the enactment of either version of the MMB on the basis that it has the
potential to provide more protection for Muslim women than they have
without legal recognition of their marriages.38
The main concerns that moderate women’s rights advocates have with
the 2010 MMB relate to unequal divorce options and the fact that the
33 Clauses 13–14, 2003 MMB.
34 Clause 12, 2010 MMB.
35 Loosely translated, it means they regard the MMB as un-Islamic.
36 Section 15(3)(b) reads: ‘Recognition in terms of paragraph (a) must be consistent with this
section and the other provisions of the Constitution.’
37 Majlisush Shura al Islam Comments on the ‘Muslim’Marriages Bill (27 May 2011), available at
http://www.themajlis.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=105:com-
ments-on-the-muslim-marriages-bill-by-the-majlisush-shura-al-islam&catid=30:mpl&Itemid=
41, accessed 1 June 2013; Legal Resources Centre Submission of the Legal Resources Centre to the
Department of Justice. The Muslim Marriages Bill, 2010 (15 March 2011), on file with author.
38 Recognition of Muslim Marriages Forum Comments to the Minister of Justice and Constitu-
tional Development on the Muslim Marriages Bill (23 May 2011); Shura Yabafazi (‘Consultation of
Women’) Submission on the Muslim Marriages Bill to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development (31 May 2011); Women’s Legal Centre Submissions on the Muslim Marriages Draft
Bill (May 2011); Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy Centre Submission to the Department of Justice and
Constitutional Development on the Muslim Marriages Bill (31 May 2011). Submissions on file with
author.
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MMB does not include all the sources of Islamic law. Their first concern is
that although the 2010 MMB includes the main forms of dissolving a
Muslim marriage that are available to women and men, it retains a
male-centred interpretation of divorce that militates against women. The
methods of dissolution incorporated in the MMB include talâq, tafwid-al-
talâq, faskh and khul’a.39 Talâq is the unilateral and exclusive right of the
husband to repudiate his wife on a no-fault basis.40 If the husband
exercises his right to talâq, he must pay his wife any outstanding mahr
(dower) that he still owes her.41 Tafwid-al-talâq is the right that a husband
delegates to his wife to talâq him on a conditional or unconditional basis.42
Faskh is a fault-based divorce available to either spouse, where the
applicant must show that she or he is entitled to dissolution of the
marriage on an Islamically permissible ground.43 Khul’a is a no-fault based
divorce, which is initiated by the wife, who has to pay some form of
compensation that does not exceed her mahr so that she can be released
from the marriage.44 While the 2010 MMB incorporates the aforemen-
tioned descriptions of talâq, tafwid-al-talâq and faskh, it includes a conser-
vative interpretation of khul’a that requires the husband’s consent for the
financial compensation to be paid by his wife. This effectively means that
the husband can prevent his wife from obtaining a divorce.45 Moderate
women’s rights advocates urge the DoJ to adopt the woman-friendly
interpretation of khul’a that does not require the husband’s consent,46
which essentially is Islam’s way of balancing the husband’s unilateral right
of talâq and affords the wife the same right to divorce. Precedent for the
latter interpretation exists in several Muslim majority countries including
Egypt, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Philippines.47
The second concern of moderate women’s rights advocates is that the
MMB limits the sources of Islamic law to only primary and secondary
sources. The primary sources include the Qur’ân (primary text of Islam)
39 Clause 1, 2010 MMB.
40 I Rushd (transl IAK Nyazee) The Distinguished Jurist’s Primer: A Translation of Bidayat
Al-Mujtahid (1996) at 72, 75, 97 and 119.
41 Mahr is given to the bride/wife by the groom/husband either at the date of marriage or at
an agreed time during the marriage, or in the absence of either, at dissolution of the marriage. It
can be anything of value that is permissible under Islamic law. ARI Doi Shariah: The Islamic Law
(1984) at 158–166.
42 J Schacht An Introduction to Islamic Law (1964) at 164.
43 JL Esposito Islam: The Straight Path (1991) at 78 and 83.
44 D Pearl A Textbook on Muslim Law (1979) at 102.
45 The interpretation requiring the husband’s consent is adopted by the Hanafî school of
thought; KN Ahmad Muslim Law of Divorce (1978) at 219–220.
46 Recognition of Muslim Marriages Forum (n 38) at 25. The Shâfi’î and Mâliki schools of
thought do not require the husband’s consent: V Malik Muslim Law of Marriage, Divorce and
Maintenance (1961) at 99.
47 Women Living Under Muslim Laws Knowing Our Rights: Women, Family, Laws and
Customs in the Muslim World (2003) at 278–279.
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and Sunnah (sayings and practices of Prophet Muhammad). Sunnah are
recorded in written form, called ahadîth. The secondary sources comprise
ijmâ (consensus of Muslim jurists) and qiyâs (analogical deductions based
on the primary sources).48 By restricting the list of Islamic law sources to
only primary and secondary sources, it will be difficult for an application
of the MMB to be responsive to the lived socio-economic realities of
Muslims. Instead, it could reinforce male-centred patriarchal interpreta-
tions of Islamic law that negatively affect women. To allow Islamic law to
achieve its dynamic potential and develop in a way that advances women’s
rights, moderate women’s rights advocates request that the DoJ include
the numerous subsidiary sources of Islamic law into the MMB to enable
ijtihâd (independent reasoning). Subsidiary sources include among others,
maslahâ (public interest), istihsân (discretion to relax a rule where it would
result in harm), ‘urf and ‘adat (practices followed within the commu-
nity).49
Despite the above concerns, moderate women’s rights advocates rec-
ognise that the longer Muslim marriages are not afforded legal recognition
in South Africa, the longer Muslim women will continue to be margina-
lised and left unprotected without access to legal recourse. The South
African judiciary has made great strides in providing relief to Muslim
female litigants, who suffer disadvantage as a result of non-recognition of
their marriages.50 However, it is a financially and emotionally exhausting
endeavour to have to approach the court system each time they need to
assert claims arising from their marriages. Not all women can afford to do
so. After weighing up the cost of having either version of the MMB
enacted against no legal recognition of Muslim marriages, moderate
women’s rights advocates prefer to have either version enacted as soon as
possible. They justify this choice as a strategy to ensure immediate
protection for women. Thereafter, they will most likely launch constitu-
tional challenges against the MMB to enable a more gender-consistent
interpretation of gender-impugned provisions.
In the next section, I consider in more detail the manner in which
African customary marriages are regulated through the RCMA for the
48 SS Ali Gender and Human Rights in Islam and International Law: Equal Before Allah, Unequal
Before Man? (2000) at 19–22.
49 Recognition of Muslim Marriages Forum (n 38) at 18; AAA Fyzee Outlines of Muham-
madan Law (1949) at 21.
50 Ryland v Edros 1997 (2) SA 690 (C); Khan v Khan 2005 (2) SA 272 (T); Cassim v Cassim and
Others (Part A) (TPD) unreported case no 3954/06 (15 December 2006); Amod v Multilateral
Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality Intervening) 1999 (4) SA1319 (SCA);
Mahomed v Mahomed (ECP) unreported case no 2154/08 (Judgment delivered 29 May 2009);
Hoosain v Dangor (WCC) unreported case no 18141/09 (Judgment delivered 18 November
2009); Arendse v Arendse and Others (WCC) Reportable judgment, case no 1659/2009
(Judgment delivered 20August 2012); Daniels v Campbell NO and Others 2004 (5) SA331 (CC);
Hassam v Jacobs NO and Others 2009 (5) SA 572 (CC).
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purpose of extrapolating lessons for the regulation of Muslim marriages.
Many leading scholars of African customary law and NGOs have com-
mented on the provisions of the RCMA.51 It is not my intention to
rehash their observations, except to draw on them to the extent that they
offer useful parallel insights for the regulation of Muslim marriages in
South Africa.
III REGULATION OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY MARRIAGES
The RCMA recognises the following features that are particular to
African customary marriages: lobolo; polygyny; requiring the marriage to
be celebrated according to the tenets of customary law, thus enabling
traditional leaders to mediate marital disputes prior to the finalisation of
divorce proceedings; and expecting prohibitions of customary marriages
on the grounds of consanguinity or affiliation to be determined by
customary law.52
However, most of the requirements and consequences for African
customary marriages encapsulated in the RCMAare consistent with those
of a civil marriage. Thus, African customary law experts, like Chuma
Himonga, conclude that the RCMA reveals a legislative attempt to
assimilate customary marriages into the civil understanding of marriage.53
As illustrated in greater detail below, Himonga’s observation is reinforced
by the fact that the RCMA transforms the communal nature of African
customary marriages, which traditionally represents a bond between
families,54 into an individualistic-based nuclear unit that characterises the
western approach to marriage. Thus, most of the elements of marriage
51 Himonga AJ (n 23); Andrews (n 22); S Mnisi ‘(Post)colonial culture and the South African
legal system: understanding the relationship between living customary law and state law’ (2007)
28 Zeitschrift f–r Rechtssoziologie 241–251; S Sibanda ‘When is the past not the past? reflections
on customary law under South Africa’s constitutional dispensation’ (2009–2010) 17 Human
Rights Brief 31–35; W Lehnert ‘The role of the courts in the conflict betweenAfrican customary
law and human rights’ (2005) 21 SAJHR 241–277 at 274; TW Bennett ‘The conflict of laws’ in
JC Bekker, C Rautenbach and M Goolam (eds) Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa 2 ed
(2006) at 15–27; R-M Jansen ‘The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act: many women
still left out in the cold’ (2002) 27(2) Journal for Juridical Science 115–128; JM Pienaar ‘African
customary wives in South Africa: is there spousal equality after the commencement of the
Recognition of Customary MarriagesAct?’ (2003) 2 Stellenbosch Law Review 256–272; E Curran
and E Bonthuys ‘Customary law and domestic violence in rural South African communities’
(2005) 21 SAJHR 607–635. The Women’s Legal Centre (WLC), a non-governmental
organisation in Cape Town, South Africa, which mainly litigates precedent-setting cases that
impact on the rights of women, published a report in 2011 that reflects on ten years of
implementation of the RCMA; see Women’s Legal Centre Recognition of Customary Marriages
(2011), available at http://www.wlce.co.za/morph_assets/themelets/explorer/
relationship%20rights/general/Recognition%20of%20Customary%20Marriages.pdf , accessed
24 May 2013.
52 Sections 1, 2(4), 3(1)(b), 3(6), 8(4)(e), and 8(5).
53 Himonga AJ (n 23) at 85.
54 Gumede (born Shange) v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2009 (3) SA 152
(CC) at para 18; Curran and Bonthuys (n 51) at 615.
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that have a greater significant impact on power relations between spouses
mimic those of civil marriages. For instance, traditionalAfrican customary
law is not known to have set a minimum marriageable age for spouses and
requires the consent of the spouses’ fathers in order for them to enter into
an African customary marriage. Yet, the RCMA sets a minimum mar-
riageable age for both spouses and requires each to provide her and his
consent to the marriage.55 In the event that spouses are below the
minimum marriageable age, the same steps as provided for in the Marriage
Act are included in the RCMA to obtain the consent of the minor’s
guardians and/or Minister of Home Affairs.56 Furthermore, the RMCA
replaces the traditional manner in which an African customary marriage is
gradually concluded over a period of time with the expectation that the
marriage should be entered into immediately.57 African customary law
does not traditionally include the notion of a matrimonial property
regime, since property was meant to be administered for the benefit of the
family. The RCMA, however, incorporates provisions of the Matrimo-
nial Property Act 88 of 198458 and establishes community of property as
the default matrimonial property system for de facto monogamous custom-
ary marriages.59 As mentioned previously, this enables each spouse enter-
ing into a customary marriage to have a 50 per cent claim in the joint
matrimonial estate. Under traditional African customary law, children
born of a marriage where lobolo had been paid belonged to their father and
his family.60 In contrast, the RCMA enables equal parental rights and
responsibilities to be awarded in relation to children born of the mar-
riage.61 Moreover, traditional African customary law emphasises the
interests of the husband and his family when it comes to determining
issues relating to guardianship, custody and access of the children.62 Yet,
the RCMA requires a court to consider only the best interests of the
child.63 Finally, under traditional African customary law, dissolution of
the marriage was negotiated between the families of the spouses and not
between spouses themselves.64 In contrast, the RCMA incorporates
provisions of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 and stipulates that a divorce
action must be brought by either or both spouses on the ground of the
55 Section 3(1)(a).
56 Sections 3(3), 4 and 5.
57 Curran and Bonthuys (n 51) at 615.
58 Ch III.
59 Section 7.
60 Pienaar (n 51) at 267.
61 Children’s Act 38 of 2005, ch 3.
62 Pienaar (n 51) at 268.
63 Section 8(4)(d) of the RCMA, read with s 9 of the Children’sAct, s 28 of the Constitution;
see also ch 3 of the Children’s Act of 2005.
64 Himonga AJ (n 23) at 89.
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‘irretrievable breakdown of the marriage’. The latter is defined in the
RCMA in the same way as it is defined in the Divorce Act.65
Even where the RCMA incorporates traditional features of African
customary marriages, it does not do it in quite a traditional manner. For
instance, lobolo is not included as a compulsory requirement for the
conclusion of a valid customary marriage.66 Polygyny would most likely
have been abolished, but for the recognition by law-makers that enforc-
ing such a prohibition would have been difficult.67 Abolition of polygyny
would also have undoubtedly left polygynous wives without legal protec-
tion.68 The lawmakers therefore chose to legalise it, subject to certain
built-in safeguards that are not characteristic of African customary law.
The safeguards include a prerequisite that the husband must apply to court
for approval of a written contract regulating the subsequent marriage and
requiring interested parties, including existing wives, to be joined in the
application.69
The attempt to infuse African customary marriages with individual
rights and obligations akin to those that typify western-type marriages
seems to have arisen from a good faith intention of the legislature to
ameliorate the disadvantaged position of indigenous African women as a
result of the application of ‘official’ customary law.70 Official customary
law is recorded in text books, academic commentaries, case law and
legislation.71 It derives from a colonial attempt to superimpose western
law onto African customary law.72 It also comprises the selective perspec-
tives of male elders and traditional leaders, whom the colonisers and
apartheid era judiciary had relied on to determine the content of custom-
ary law, because they had assumed that these elders and leaders repre-
sented the views of everyone within traditional African communities.73
The views of African women were therefore excluded, with the result
that official customary law reflected a particular male bias that had harmful
65 Section 8(2) of the RCMA mimics s 4(1) of the Divorce Act, which reads: ‘A court may
grant a decree of divorce on the ground of the irretrievable breakdown of a marriage if it is
satisfied that the marriage relationship between the parties to the marriage has reached such a
state of disintegration that there is no reasonable prospect of the restoration of a normal marriage
relationship between them.’
66 South African Law Commission (n 27) at viii, para 4.3.2.8.
67 Ibid at x, para 6.1.25.
68 Andrews (n 22) at 321.
69 Section 7(4)(b) and (7)(a)–(b).
70 South African Law Commission (n 26) at ix–x; Women’s Legal Centre (n 51) at 5.
71 AJ Kerr ‘The nature and future of customary law’ (2009) 40 SALJ 677–689 at 679.
72 GJ van Niekerk ‘Indigenous law in South Africa – a historical and comparative perspec-
tive’ (1990) 18(1) Codicillus 34–43 at 35.
73 W van der Meide ‘Gender equality v right to culture’ (1999) 28 SALJ 100–112 at 100 and
105.
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implications for women.74 For instance, under official customary law,
wives were subjected to the control and authority of their husbands as the
family head.75 They were treated as perpetual minors with no legal
capacity to transact without the assistance of their guardians.76 They were
not permitted to own property;77 whatever monies and other property
they acquired before and during marriage became the property of their
husbands so that, on dissolution of the marriage, they were not entitled to
receive anything, even if they had contributed to the maintenance or
growth of the marital estate.78 While their husbands had the right to
unilaterally repudiate their wives if they (the husbands) were prepared to
forfeit the lobolo, wives did not have the capacity to initiate divorce
proceedings; this could only be done at the behest of their fathers, who
had discretion to do so in cases of serious maltreatment and upon return of
the lobolo that had been paid.79 Husbands were permitted to enter into
polygynous unions without requiring the approval of anyone other than
the bride’s father or applicable male relative.80 Women were not permit-
ted to inherit or become chiefs.81 And as mentioned previously, if lobolo
had been paid, the mother did not have authority over the children born
of the marriage.82
In contrast, traditional African customary law afforded women a great
deal of respect, allowed them to wield much influence over decision-
making within the family, and, along with men, permitted them to own
property that was meant to be used for the benefit of the family.83 So even
though patriarchy existed in pre-colonial African customary law, it was
applied in a way that prioritised communal interests, with the result that
female members of the community were protected.84 There was there-
fore no need for a matrimonial property regime in African customary
marriages, like there exists in western-type marriages, because the empha-
sis was on ensuring that all members of the community were taken care of
rather than on ownership of property.85 However, the colonial and
74 J Williams and J Klusener Submissions to the Western Cape Provincial Parliament: Traditional
Court’s Bill 2012 (2012) at 20.
75 Van der Meide (n 73) at 102–103.
76 Pienaar (n 51) at 264.
77 C Zungu ‘Gender equality and customary law in South Africa’ in T Falola and B
House-Soremekun (eds) Gender, Sexuality and Mothering in Africa (2011) 235–249 at 235–236.
78 Ibid at 238.
79 Curran and Bonthuys (n 51) at 621.
80 Andrews (n 22) at 1486.
81 Zungu (n 77) at 235–236, 240 and 242. The male primogeniture rule was abolished by the
Constitutional Court in Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, and Others (Commission for
Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae) 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC).
82 Pienaar (n 51) at 267.
83 Gumede supra (n 54) at para 18; Van der Meide (n 73) at 106.
84 Curran and Bonthuys (n 51) at 613.
85 Van der Meide (n 73) at 107.
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apartheid laws codified African customary law in a way that entrenched
patriarchy in a particularly pernicious manner.86 It is therefore not
surprising that given the vast divergence described above between tradi-
tional African customary law and official customary law, the latter has
come to be viewed as a terribly distorted version of traditional African
customary law.87
Apart from the RCMA provisions described earlier to combat the
gender-based discriminatory effects of official customary law, the legisla-
ture’s attempt to promote gender equality within African customary
marriages is no more evident than in the inclusion of s 6 entitled ‘‘Equal
status and capacity of spouses’’:
A wife in a customary marriage has, on the basis of equality with her husband
and subject to the matrimonial property system governing the marriage, full
status and capacity, including the capacity to acquire assets and to dispose of
them, to enter into contracts and to litigate, in addition to any rights and
powers that she might have at customary law.
The Constitutional Court interprets this provision as abolishing the
husband’s marital power over his wife and affording the spouses’ equal
dignity and capacity in the marriage.88 However, Ericka Curran and Elsje
Bonthuys observe that the provision affords a wife ‘full status’ and not
‘equal status’. They argue that this difference in wording may cause a
court to interpret the provision as enabling a husband to retain his
position as head of the household.89 JM Pienaar also contends that, since
the legislation does not remove any rights and powers that a wife may
have under customary law, this might entrench inequality among polygy-
nous wives, since a first wife might be able to retain her traditional status as
the more powerful wife.90 With due respect to the aforementioned
scholars, the Constitutional Court has thus far interpreted African cus-
tomary law in a way that promotes gender equality.91 It is therefore
86 Gumede supra (n 54) at para 17. A Claassens and S Mnisi ‘Rural women redefining land
rights in the context of living customary law’ (2009) 25 SAJHR 491–516 at 507.
87 TW Bennett ‘Legal pluralism and the family in South Africa: lessons from customary law
reform’ (2011) 25 Emory International Law Review 1029–1059 at 1042.
88 Gumede supra (n 54) at para 32.
89 Curran and Bonthuys (n 51) at 620.
90 Pienaar (n 51) at 259.
91 In the case of Bhe supra (n 81), the court struck down the male primogeniture rule. In
Shilubana, the court gave effect to a tribal decision to appoint a woman as chief; see Shilubana
and Others v Nwamitwa 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC). In Gumede supra (n 54), the court enabled the
default matrimonial property regime of community of property to also apply to de facto
monogamous marriages that had been entered into prior to the enactment of the RCMA. More
recently, in Mayelane, the court developed the customary law of the Xitsonga community in
accordance with the Constitution by requiring the consent of the first wife for the validity of a
subsequent customary marriage; see Mayelane v Ngwenyama and Others [2013] ZACC 14
(Judgment handed down 30 May 2013).
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unlikely that the Court will interpret the provisions of the RCMA in a
way that engenders inequality between any of the spouses in a customary
marriage.
In addition to the assimilation approach already mentioned, a second-
ary approach is evident in the enactment of the RCMA, namely, that it
reinforces codification of certain official customary law rules, which may
have negative consequences for women. For instance, the provision that
enables the court to take into consideration any arrangement entered into
under customary law when making an order for maintenance could be
counter-productive for women. The payment of lobolo had traditionally
been intended to provide security for the wife and children in the event of
dissolution of the marriage.92 Since lobolo had traditionally been paid in
the form of cattle or other livestock, such security would have existed
when the marriage ended. However, these days, lobolo is frequently paid
in cash, which is usually spent by the time the marriage ends.93 If lobolo has
been paid, the court might make a lesser maintenance order, which may
cause the wife to find herself in a financially destitute position.94
Despite the bona fide attempt of the legislature to protect and advance
the rights of women in African customary marriages, the RCMA is also
criticised for not reflecting ‘living’ customary law.95 Living customary law
refers to those customs that are practised within indigenous African
communities, which may vary from community to community.96 Unlike
official customary law, which is the fruit of a written tradition, living
customary law develops through oral tradition.97 This informs the fluid,
dynamic and adaptable nature of living customary law, which allows it to
be more responsive to the lived realities of indigenous African communi-
ties.98 In contrast, official customary law is counter-intuitive to the
traditional nature of African customary law because it fossilises the rules,
thereby making them rigid and far more difficult to develop in response to
the changing needs of society.99 Sindiso Mnisi Weeks observes that there
is a disjuncture between the codified version of African customary law
and the living customary law, as practised within indigenous African
communities, in that the former is not necessarily a true reflection of the
92 Pienaar (n 51) at 267.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Lehnert (n 51) at 274.
96 Himonga Recht In Afrika (n 23) at 168; GJ van Niekerk ‘Legal pluralism’ in JC Bekker,
C Rautenbach and M Goolam (eds) Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa (2006) at 5 fn 3.
97 Himonga Recht In Afrika (n 23) at 168.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
371THE RECOGNITION OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY MARRIAGES IN SOUTH AFRICA
JOBNAME: Acta Juridica 13 PAGE: 16 SESS: 6 OUTPUT: Mon Nov 25 10:34:53 2013
/dtp22/juta/juta/acta−juridica13/ch17
latter.100 Hence, official customary law has less potential than living
customary law to engender substantive justice.101
By regulating African customary marriages in a way that does not
enable recognition of living customary law, the RCMAfails to address the
root causes of patriarchal African customary rules and instead promises
superficial protection.102 In fact, the RCMA may be precisely that against
which the legislators sought to protect women, namely, the application of
official customary law. Put differently, the RCMA is tantamount to
another form of official customary law, which incorporates and codifies
features that are unfamiliar to many indigenous African communities.103
Consequently, implementation of the RMCA becomes challenging espe-
cially in rural African communities.104 Had the RCMA enabled applica-
tion of living customary law, its aims and objectives may have been more
easily accepted by members of indigenous African communities, which
would have facilitated smoother implementation of the legislation.105
However, numerous implementation problems have arisen because the
RCMA is not suitably responsive to the lived realities of indigenous
African communities. For instance, registration of marriages is a foreign
concept in those communities. Therefore, the requirement that African
customary marriages must be registered is seldom followed.106 Although
lack of registration does not affect the validity of the marriage, the
registration requirement has been misunderstood by officials from the
Department of Home Affairs who refuse to recognise unregistered
African customary marriages as valid.107 This has been particularly prob-
lematic for spouses wishing to apply for divorce and those claiming against
their spouse’s intestate estate.108 Another example relates to the require-
ment that existing wives must be joined in applications for polygynous
marriages.109 Himonga observes that African wives in rural areas are
unable to afford the costs involved to travel to courts and the costs of legal
procedures.110 Thus, polygynous marriages continue to be entered into in
the traditional manner without the provisions of the RCMA being
implemented.111
100 Mnisi (n 51) at 247.
101 Van der Meide (n 73) at 104.
102 Andrews (n 22) at 331.
103 Himonga AJ (n 23) at 91.
104 Lehnert (n 51) at 274.
105 Williams and Klusener (n 74) at 22 argue that the oral nature of living customary law
allows it to be more easily understood and accepted by the indigenous African communities.
106 RCMA, s 4.
107 Women’s Legal Centre (n 5) at 12.
108 Ibid.
109 RCMA, s 7(6).
110 Himonga AJ (n 23) at 106.
111 Ibid.
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In contrast, most of the provisions in the MMB incorporate traditional
Islamic law features of a Muslim marriage as practised within South
African Muslim communities. In the following section, those provisions
are described in greater detail. Thus, if enacted, the MMB may be far
easier for Muslims to implement, since many of the requirements for
marriage would be familiar to them.
IV REGULATION OF MUSLIM MARRIAGES
Before embarking on a description of some of the Islamic law rights and
obligations in marriage and divorce, a brief historical context regarding
the development of Islamic law might be in order.
During pre-seventh century Arabia, which Muslims refer to as the
period of Jahilliya (‘Age of Ignorance’), patriarchal rules and customs
resulted in the oppression of females.112 Throughout this time, female
infanticide was rife; men were permitted to marry as many wives as they
wished; women had no right to divorce; women had no right to acquire,
own or manage property; a woman’s consent to marriage was not
required; women were sold in marriage through the payment of mahr by
husbands to their fathers; women had no rights over their children;
women had no right to inherit; and they were not allowed to participate
in public matters.
Islam was introduced as a response to the socio-economic realities of
seventh-centuryArabia. One of its primary aims was to eradicate the ills of
Jahilliya by advancing social justice, providing protection to females,
uplifting their position and restoring their dignity.113 This was achieved
through the implementation of reforms, which emanated from the
primary sources of Islamic law to promote the Islamic objectives of
equality, justice, freedom, fairness, and the protection of human wel-
fare.114 The reforms included: the abolition of female infanticide; limita-
tions on polygyny; granting females full property rights including owner-
ship of their mahr; allowing them to be contracting parties in their own
marriages; affording them the right to divorce; recognising their right to
be maintained during and after marriage; enabling them to participate in
public and religious matters; and permitting them to succeed on inherit-
ance.115 Consequently, many Muslim scholars contend that the spirit,
norms and values that emanate from Islam, as revealed in the primary
112 AE Mayer Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics (1999) at 97–98.
113 Ibid.
114 S Sabiq Fiqh Us-Sunnah. Doctrine of Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (n d) at 105; Z Mir-Hosseini
‘The construction of gender in Islamic legal thought and strategies for reform’ (2003) 1(1)
Journal of Women in the Middle East and the Islamic World 1–28 at 13; M Badran Feminism in Islam:
Secular and Religious Convergences (2009) at 323.
115 JL Esposito with N DeLong-Bas Women in Muslim Family Law 2 ed (2001) at 4, 14 and 23.
WB Hallaq The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (2005) at 22–23.
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sources, promote human dignity and gender equality and do not endorse
inequality between the sexes.116
Although the reforms that were introduced through Islam were con-
sidered revolutionary for the seventh century,117 they were still heavily
influenced by patriarchal norms.118 As a result, there was an expectation
that females would be taken care of by their male relatives.119 For
instance, inheritance for females was stipulated at a lesser ratio than males,
because seventh-century Arabian society required male relatives to use
their greater share of the inheritance to support their female relatives.120
Some reforms also may have been intended to be introduced gradually,
otherwise they may not have been immediately accepted by and imple-
mented within the community. Hence, some scholars argue that
polygyny was not prohibited outright.121 Yet, there is a suggestion in the
Qur’ân that polygyny should not be followed, since the limits prescribed
by the Qur’ân, namely, that a husband must treat each of his wives justly or
equally, are not capable of being adhered to.122
From its inception, Islamic law was intended to be developed in
response to the changing needs of societies. This in a way mirrors the
operation of living customary law. Thus, the recognition of secondary
and subsidiary sources of Islamic law, which are not all text-based, such as
‘urf and adat, was an acknowledgment that the primary sources may not
have all the solutions to challenges presented within societies. In fact, the
application of ijtihâd ensured that Islamic law would constantly evolve and
be responsive to the lived realities of communities.123 However, around
the thirteenth century, after the formation of the four Sunni madhâhib
116 Cachalia (n 9) at 403; N Moosa ‘Human rights in Islam’ (1998) 14 South African Law Journal
508–524 at 510.
117 Ali (n 48) at 56.
118 A Wadud Quran and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective (1999) at
80–81.
119 Qur’ân 4:34: ‘Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because God has given
the one more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from their means.’
120 Qur’ân 4:7:‘From what is left by the parents and those nearest related there is a share for
men and a share for women, whether the property be small or large, – a determinate share.’;
Qur’ân 4:11: ‘God (thus) directs you as regards your children’s (inheritance): to the male, a
portion equal to that of two females.’; Qur’ân 4:176: ‘[If the deceased leaves behind] brothers
and sisters, (they share), the male having twice the share of the female.’
121 N Moosa ‘The interim and final constitutions and Muslim personal law: implications for
South African Muslim women’ (1998) 9(2) Stellenbosch Law Review 196–206 at 197.
122 Qur’ân 4:3: ‘If ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly with the orphans, marry
women of your choice, two, or three, or four; but if ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly
(with them), then only one, or (a captive) that your right hands possess. That will be more
suitable, to prevent you from doing injustice.’ But then the Qur’ân advises in 4:129: ‘Ye are
never able to be fair and just as between women, even if it is your ardent desire.’
123 Ali (n 48) at 80; E Moosa ‘Prospects for Muslim Law in South Africa: a history and recent
developments’ (1996) 3 Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law 130–155 at 144 and 149.
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(schools of thought),124 Sunni Muslim jurists decided that the develop-
ment of Islamic law was complete and they no longer officially permitted
the application of ijtihâd.125 A period of taqlîd commenced in which
Islamic law was rigidly interpreted and applied by fuqaha (legal jurists)
within the narrow confines of the Sunni madhâhib.126 The founders of the
Sunni madhâhib lived during the eighth and ninth centuries, so their
interpretations of the primary sources of Islamic law were also informed
by patriarchal norms that pervaded Arabian society.127 With the ‘closing
of the doors of ijtihâd’,128 the patriarchal interpretations of the founders of
the Sunni madhâhib were followed blindly by subsequent fuqaha and now
also inform present Sunni mainstream understandings of Islamic law.129
The official clampdown on ijtihâd meant that fiqh (Islamic jurispru-
dence) could not develop sufficiently to satisfactorily respond to and
address the challenges that arose in societies during the post-ijtihâd era.130
The developmental nature of Islamic law was thus hampered and it
assumed an antiquated disposition.131 In particular, the patriarchal norms
that informed interpretations by fuqaha resulted in rulings that were based
on an assumption of gender inequality.132 The objectives of Islamic law,
including gender equality, could therefore not be fully realised.133 Instead
of promoting one of the Qur’ân’s primary purposes, which is to respect
and protect the human dignity of females, centuries of traditional,
conservative and androcentric interpretations of the primary sources of
Islamic law caused a deviation from Islam’s true ethos.134 Those interpre-
tations resulted in rules that discriminate against females, thereby reducing
the rights that Islam had originally afforded them, relegating them to an
inferior status vis-à-vis men and contributing to their oppression.135 For
124 The Sunni madhâhib include Hanafî, Mâliki, Shâfi’î and Hanbali. Each madhhab is named
after its founder: Ab– Hanîfa (699–767 AD), Muhammad Al-Imâm Mâlik ibn Anas (713–795
AD), Muhammad ibn Idris al- Shâfi’î (767–820 AD) and Ahmed ibn Hanbal (780–855 AD).
AA An-Na’im ‘Shari’a and Islamic Family Law: Transition and Transformation’ in AA
An-Na’im (ed) Islamic Family Law in a Changing World: A Global Resource Book (2002) 1–22 at 5.
125 AA An-Na’im ‘The dichotomy between religious and secular discourse in Islamic
societies’ in M Afkhami (ed) Faith and Freedom: Women’s Human Rights in the Muslim World
(1995) at 91. Ijtihâd is, however, still permitted within the Shi’i tradition: Esposito (n 43) at 78
and 83.
126 MAE Bulbulia ‘The ethical foundations and distinctive features of Islamic law’ (1985) 8
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 215–236 at 224.
127 Hallaq (n 115) at 157.
128 Schacht (n 42) at 71.
129 D Pearl and W Menski Muslim Family Law 3 ed (1998) at 29.
130 An-Na’im (n 125) at 56–58.
131 Moosa (n 123) at 144.
132 Mir-Hosseini (n 114) at 13.
133 Ibid.
134 Mayer (n 112) at 97–98.
135 M Afkhami ‘Introduction’ in M Afkhami (ed) Faith and Freedom: Women’s Human Rights in
the Muslim World (1995) at 10.
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example, the conservative interpretation of khul’a mentioned earlier in
this paper clearly illustrates the impact that patriarchal readings had on the
erosion of women’s divorce rights in present-day Islamic law.
Consequently, what has emerged in the application of Islamic law
within South African Muslim communities is a medley of traditional
benefits that Islamic law affords to women, coupled with patriarchal
expectations. For example, the South African ulamâ recognise that a
husband has the sole obligation to maintain his wife and children.
However, they also accept a patriarchal interpretation of the husband’s
maintenance obligation, as requiring his wife’s obedience.136 Similarly,
while they require payment of mahr by the husband to the wife to validate
the Muslim marriage,137 they accept the various traditional purposes for
mahr,138 including the sexist expectation that once agreement regarding
mahr is reached, a wife must provide sex on demand to her husband unless
it is during an Islamically impermissible time, such as menstruation.139
The South African ulamâ are further selective about which Islamic law
benefits they encourage. For instance, as indicated previously, traditional
Islamic law expects spouses to maintain separate estates from the date of
marriage until its dissolution.140 The reason for this rule, during the
context of seventh-centuryArabia, was to protect a wife’s right to acquire,
own and manage her own property. However, the rule also enables labour
performed by one spouse in the home to be remunerated by the other
spouse, for women to be compensated for breastfeeding and for either
spouse to be compensated for contributions to the maintenance or
growth of the other’s estate. While the South African ulamâ are quick to
assert the first part of the rule, they do not easily encourage the second part
of the rule. Moreover, they recognise polygyny, but do not ensure that
the Qur’ânic limits that are placed on it are strictly followed.
136 Such a patriarchal interpretation is based on a conservative translation of Qur’ân 4:34, one
of which is offered by Abdullah Yusuf Ali, which reads: ‘Men are the protectors and maintainers
of women, because God has given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they
support them from their means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obedient, and
guard in (the husband’s) absence what God would have them guard. As to those women on
whose part ye fear disloyalty and ill-conduct, admonish them (first), (next), refuse to share their
beds, (and last) beat them (lightly); but if they return to obedience, seek not against them means
of (annoyance).; see Abdullah Yusuf Ali (transl) The Holy Qur’ân (1946).
137 AD Ajijola Introduction to Islamic Law (1981) at 117 and 154.
138 Some consider the payment of mahr as a symbol of respect for the wife. Some regard it as a
form of security for the wife, given that the parties’ estates are kept separate throughout the
marriage. Others, like Ajijola (ibid), view it as a deterrent ‘against the husband’s arbitrary power
of divorce.’
139 Mir-Hosseini (n 114) at 13.
140 K Ali ‘Progressive Muslims and Islamic jurisprudence: the necessity for critical engage-
ment with marriage and divorce law’ in O Safi (ed) Progressive Muslims (2003) 163–189 at 175.
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The MMB incorporates many of the traditional benefits recognised
under Islamic law, including those mentioned in the previous paragraph,
but is silent on the patriarchal expectations accompanying those benefits.
Presumably, those expectations will have to be clarified by the judiciary.
Given the internal limitation contained in s 15(3)(b) of the Constitution,
and the fact that the judiciary has endeavoured to promote gender justice
in the cases regarding Muslim marriages and African customary marriages
that it has thus far adjudicated,141 there is hope that it will interpret the
provisions of the MMB in a manner that advances gender equality.
Not only does the MMB include provisions that recognise features of
Muslim marriages that are practised within South African Muslim com-
munities, it also incorporates those that are recognised under Islamic law,
but that are not practised within those communities.
Features particular to Muslim marriages that are practised within South
African Muslim communities, which are incorporated into the MMB
include:142 marriage by proxy, where the bride’s walî (guardian) or his
waqîl (representative) enters into the nikahnama (marriage contract) on her
behalf;143 a default out of community of property regime excluding the
accrual system;144 the husband’s unilateral obligation to maintain his wife
and children;145 mediation preceding the finalisation of divorce;146 vari-
ous forms of divorce available to women and men, which are mentioned
141 See Ryland v Edros 1997 (2) SA 690 (C); Khan v Khan 2005 (2) SA 272 (T); Cassim v Cassim
and Others (Part A) (TPD) unreported case no 3954/06 (15 December 2006); Amod v
Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality Intervening) 1999 (4) SA
1319 (SCA); Mahomed v Mahomed (ECP) unreported case no 2154/08 (Judgment delivered 29
May 2009); Hoosain v Dangor (WCC) unreported case no 18141/09 (Judgment delivered 18
November 2009); Arendse v Arendse and Others (WCC) Reportable judgment, case no
1659/2009 (Judgment delivered 20 August 2012); Daniels v Campbell NO and Others 2004 (5)
SA 331 (CC); Hassam v Jacobs NO and Others 2009 (5) SA 572 (CC). Also, Gumede (born Shange)
v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2009 (3) SA 152 (CC); Bhe and Others v
Magistrate, Khayelitsha, and Others (Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae) 2005 (1) SA
580 (CC); Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa 2009 (2) SA66 (CC) and Mayelani v Ngwenyama and
Others [2013] ZACC 14 (Judgment handed down 30 May 2013).
142 I describe the features of the MMB in greater detail in Amien (n 1 IJLP) at 374–380.
143 2010 MMB, cl 5.
144 Ibid, cl 8(1). The accrual system enables spouses to enter the marriage with separate estates
and to maintain separate estates during the marriage. At dissolution of the marriage, spouses
share in the accrual of each other’s estates. See ss 2 and 3 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of
1984. Section 2 provides: ‘Every marriage out of community of property in terms of an
antenuptial contract by which community of property and community of profit and loss are
excluded . . . is subject to the accrual system . . . except in so far as that system is expressly
excluded by the antenuptial contract. Section 3 provides: ‘At the dissolution of a marriage
subject to the accrual system, by divorce or by the death of one or both of the spouses, the
spouse whose estate shows no accrual or a smaller accrual than the estate of the other spouse, or
his estate if he is deceased, acquires a claim against the other spouse or his estate for an amount
equal to half of the difference between the accrual of the respective estates of the spouses.’
145 Ibid, cl 11(2)(a)–(b).
146 Ibid, cl 12.
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earlier in this paper;147 the expectation that a woman should observe iddah
(‘waiting period’) following the dissolution of her marriage;148 and when
making an order for guardianship, custody and access of minor children
born of the marriage, a court must consider Islamic law when determin-
ing what is in the best interests of the child.149
Features of a Muslim marriage incorporated into the MMB that are
recognised under Islamic law but that are not practised within South
African Muslim communities include: the right of both spouses’ to be
compensated for the maintenance or growth of each others estates;150 a
wife’s right to be remunerated for breastfeeding and to be compensated
for her services rendered in her husband’s or his family’s business;151 a
wife’s right to receive compensatory payment namely, mut’ah al-talâq in
the event that the marriage is terminated at the unjustified behest of the
husband;152 that polygyny be permitted only according to the prerequi-
sites laid down by the Qur’ân;153 and since Islamic law does not recognise
the principle of prescription for civil claims, the MMB recommends that
any unpaid arrear maintenance owed by the husband should be exempt
from the provisions of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969.154
As a result of receiving input from traditional and progressive Muslim
scholars, drafters of the MMB included the more progressive rules from
among the four Sunni madhâhib. The rationale for framing the rights and
obligations recognised in the MMB within the Sunni paradigm is most
likely due to the fact that the majority of South Africans follow the Sunni
madhhab. However, the MMB still does not incorporate all the Islamic law
rules that have the potential to balance out negative effects of other rules.
For instance, a spouse’s right to be compensated for unpaid labour in the
home is not explicitly included in the MMB. In the current SouthAfrican
context, the out of community of property matrimonial regime militates
against many Muslim women who are unable to amass estates during the
marriage and then find themselves financially destitute at the dissolution
of the marriage.155 By simply drawing on the paradigm of traditional
Sunni law, a claim for their unpaid labour in the home could ensure that a
147 Ibid, cl 1.
148 Ibid, cl 1. In the case of divorce, iddah must be observed for three menstrual cycles or three
months and in the case of death, it lasts for four menstrual cycles or four months and ten days. If
the woman is pregnant, iddah extends until the birth of the child regardless whether or not the
marriage terminates as a result of divorce or death. While observing iddah, a woman may not
socialise and is expected to remain in the house. In particular, she is not permitted to become
romantically involved with anyone or marry during this period. Doi (n 41) at 198–203.
149 2010 MMB, cl 10(1).
150 Ibid, cl 9(8)(b)(ii).
151 Ibid, cl 11(2).
152 Ibid, cl 9(8)(g).
153 Ibid, cl 8(4)–(11).
154 2010 MMB, cl 11(5).
155 Recognition of Muslim Marriages Forum (n 38) at 21.
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wife is financially protected when the marriage is terminated. In fact,
Muslim women’s rights advocates go one step further and argue for a
default community of property regime or an out of community of
property regime subject to accrual.156 Unlike African customary law,
where the notions of community of property or accrual are foreign, those
two regimes could be justified through the prism of Islamic contract law.
Since a Muslim marriage is regarded as a contract – the terms of which are
negotiated and agreed to between the spouses, a default matrimonial
property regime is tantamount to implicit agreement about that regime
unless the parties agree otherwise. Although the MMB enables parties to
opt out of the default regime,157 it would require spouses who are
sufficiently empowered to exercise that choice. For the many South
African Muslim women who are not in that position, a default commu-
nity of property or accrual system could provide more protection.
The fact that the MMB is drafted within the framework of Sunni law
also means that certain groups, such as the minority group of Shi’ite
followers within the South African Muslim communities, same-sex
Muslim couples and inter-religious couples where the male is not Muslim
or the female is of a religion other than Christianity or Judaism, may be
excluded from the ambit of the MMB.158 At the same time, those who
may not be able to marry in terms of the MMB would not be completely
without protection. If they wish, they could still have a nikah coupled
with a civil registration of marriage. Shi’ite and inter-religious couples
could derive civil benefits under the Marriage Act and same-sex couples
could do the same under the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006.
Thus far, the manner of regulating African customary marriages and
Muslim marriages appears to be quite different. As mentioned previously,
greater effort has been made to ensure consistency between African
customary marriages and civil marriages. In contrast, the MMB essentially
proposes integration of the nuanced features of Muslim marriages into the
156 Ibid at 22.
157 2010 MMB, cl 8(1).
158 Clause 1 of the 2010 MMB defines a Muslim as ‘a person who believes in the oneness of
Allah and who believes in the Holy Messenger Muhammad as the final prophet and who has
faith in all the essentials of Islam’. If a Sunni understanding of this definition is adopted, it could
exclude followers of the Shi’i tradition from being able to register their marriages in terms of the
MMB. The MMB also explicitly excludes same-sex couples through its definition of a Muslim
marriage as ‘a marriage between a man and a woman contracted in accordance with Islamic law
only’. Inter-religious marriages may further be excluded if a traditional and conservative
understanding of marriage is adopted. A traditional approach to Qur’ân 5:6 is that Muslim men
are permitted to marry only Jewish and Christian women without requiring them to convert.
Qur’ân 5:6 reads ‘(Lawful unto you in marriage) are (not only) chaste women who are believers,
but chaste women among the people of the Book’. In contrast, Qur’ân 2:221 is conservatively
interpreted to mean that Muslim women are not permitted to marry any non-Muslim men
unless they convert to Islam. Qur’ân 2:221 reads Do not . . . marry (your girls) to unbelievers
until they believe.’
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SouthAfrican secular framework.159 Yet, an interesting trend between the
regulation of African customary marriages and Mulim marriages is also
discernable. Where practically feasible, the legislators appear to try to
maintain consistency between civil, customary and religious marriages
with the features of a civil marriage as the benchmark. For instance,
provisions in the RCMA and MMB relating to consent, proof of age,
method of registering a marriage and processes to change a matrimonial
property regime are very similar to the requirements for civil marriages.160
Furthermore, legislators also appear to try to maintain consistency
between certain provisions in the RCMAand MMB that are not found in
the Marriage Act, such as clauses relating to the administrative require-
ments for polygyny and the equal status and capacity of spouses.161
Normative considerations relating to assimilation aside,162 it may be
that legislators incline toward assimilation to make administration of the
different marriages easier. Unless assimilation efforts erode the very
protections that they were intended to provide, there should be no
problem with trying to maintain consistency among different types of
marriages for procedural purposes. To make this determination, an
assessment of each context must be made. For instance, the study of
African customary marriages in this paper demonstrates that the superim-
position of civil requirements for registration does not work in rural
African indigenous communities. However, it may work in South
African Muslim communities, which reside mostly in urban areas. The
same argument applies to attempts at consistency between African cus-
tomary marriages and Muslim marriages. The clauses mentioned in the
previous paragraph relating to polygyny and the equal status and capacity
of spouses are not inconsistent with the requirements of Islamic law, so no
harm was done there. Perhaps the drafters of the MMB had actually
applied their minds to the impact that an attempt at consistency between
procedural requirements for African customary marriages and Muslim
marriages would have on traditional Islamic law rules and the South
African Muslim communities.
In the next section, I attempt to extract insights from the comparative
study undertaken in this paper between the regulation of African custom-
ary marriages and Muslim marriages. When I first started working on this
project, I anticipated deriving one, at most two insights. I was therefore
159 Amien IJLP (n 1) at 374.
160 2010 MMB, cl 5–8. RCMA, ss 3–5 and 10.
161 2010 MMB, cl 3 and 6. Clause 3 reads: ‘A wife and a husband in a Muslim marriage are
equal in human dignity and both have, on the basis of equality, full status, capacity and financial
independence, including the capacity to own and acquire assets and to dispose of them, to enter
into contracts and to litigate.’
162 Here, I refer to the assumption that the system that is being set as the bench-mark for
assimilation is superior.
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pleasantly surprised to discover the emergence of several significant
lessons for the regulation of Muslim marriages.
V INSIGHTS OBTAINED FROM THE REGULATION OF
AFRICAN CUSTOMARY MARRIAGES FOR THE
REGULATION OF MUSLIM MARRIAGES
The lessons that can be gleaned from the regulation of African customary
marriages can broadly be identified according to the following categories,
most of which are interlinked: problems associated with assimilation;
necessity for consultation with diverse voices within communities; need
for buy-in to legislation; risks attached to codification; need to consider
context and impact of legislation; and potential for gendered reform of
laws.
The first main lesson emanating from this study relates to problems
associated with assimilation. It has already been alluded to in this paper
that assimilation can be problematic from a normative perspective when
the achievement of consistency between laws is based on an assumption
that one type of law is superior to another. From an impact perspective,
the transplantation of characteristics from one type of legal system to a
wholly different type of legal system carries with it the inherent risk that
nuanced aspects of the transplanted system might be overlooked during
the assimilation process, which could further marginalise already margina-
lised members of the community, including women.163 In this way,
assimilation attempts that involve the superimposition of concepts and
requirements that are alien to a culture or religion might not be followed
by members of those communities. The intended protections of the
legislation might therefore be lost on its intended beneficiaries. At the
same time, assimilation that is promoted to produce consistency for
administrative purposes might be workable, provided it does not result in
implementation difficulties that negate the aims of the legislation.
To determine how best to draft the legislation in a way that will ensure
maximum impact, consultation with all the relevant voices within the
targeted communities is crucial. This means that drafters must obtain
insights from not only those who purport to be the leaders of the
communities, but also from ordinary members of the communities,
including women. It should also not be assumed that those who claim to
be women’s rights advocates necessarily represent the views of all women
within the communities. In the same way, it should not be assumed that
the views of those who claim to be the leaders of communities necessarily
represent the views of all the members of those communities.
163 Amien IJLP (n 1) at 368–369.
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To ensure implementation, there is a further need for the intended
beneficiaries of the legislation to buy-in to the legislation. In the context
of Muslim marriages, this unfortunately means that the majority of the
ulamâ need to be satisfied with the legislation because they have the power
to discourage Muslims from registering their marriages under the MMB.
Unlike the RCMA, the MMB requires those marriages entered into after
its commencement to be registered in order for them to be valid.164 The
legislature should give serious consideration to changing this requirement
to mimic the approach adopted in the RCMA, because to impose
registration for the purposes of validity will further disempower margina-
lised women.
Nevertheless, the more pertinent question is how much of the ulamâ’s
demands must be conceded? Through s 15(3)(b), the Constitution appears
to provide clear guidance: legislation recognising religious marriages
cannot be inconsistent with other provisions of the Constitution, includ-
ing gender equality. However, in order for the legislation to have the
required effect, it needs to have the approval of the majority of the ulamâ.
So we find ourselves in a circuitous route, where gender equality is pitted
against freedom of religion. It seems therefore that the only way out of the
quagmire is to adopt a balanced approach that involves reasonable
compromises in respect of both rights.
Can the ulamâ’s current demands, mentioned earlier in the paper, then
be construed as reasonable? I would argue that in respect of compulsory
mediation, this could be conceded, provided the mediation orders are
appealable. The latter should provide sufficient protection against orders
that discriminate against female litigants. On the question of Muslim
judges and Islamic law experts as assessors: it will not be practically feasible
for every MMB-related dispute to be adjudicated by a Muslim judge
because the South African judiciary simply does not have enough Muslim
judges to enable a sufficient turnaround time for cases, to ensure that
justice is speedily achieved.165 However, the demand for Islamic law
experts to preside with a judge as assessors is reasonable, since the South
African judicial system is not yet equipped with judges who are experts in
Islamic law.
A further lesson derived from the regulation of African customary
marriages is the risk that rules underscored by patriarchal norms could
become ossified through codification. Perhaps one way to address that is
for the judiciary to ensure that it constantly interprets the legislation in a
way that is responsive to the changing needs of African indigenous
communities. The imperative to adopt this interpretive approach is
provided for in s 39(2) of the Constitution, which reads:
164 2010 MMB, cl 6(1)(a) and 10.
165 Amien IJLP (n 1) at 378.
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When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit,
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.
In this way, the judiciary might enable a measure of consistency between
living customary law and codified law as it pertains to African customary
marriages. Of course, such a process could be time-consuming and may
not be capable of being responsive at the same rate at which norms and
practices evolve within communities. Similarly, the regulation of Muslim
marriages also has the potential of codifying potentially discriminatory
rules. If that happens, it will be up to the judiciary to interpret the
legislation in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution, particu-
larly gender equality.
This is why it is important to ensure from the outset that legislation
purporting to regulate marriages contains mechanisms that can reflect the
lived realities of the people that it aims to protect. In the case of African
customary marriages, the need to embody living customary law to ensure
that the legislation is responsive to the changing needs of African indig-
enous communities has been highlighted. In the context of Muslim
marriages, it is important to incorporate subsidiary sources of Islamic law
into the legislation to enable a process of ijtihâd. In this way, Islamic law as
it pertains to Muslim marriage and divorce can develop in a way that
meets the socio-economic realities of South African Muslim communi-
ties. Gendered reform of Islamic law then also becomes possible, because
reliance on the whole body of sources of Islamic law can enable progres-
sive interpretations that will be consistent with gender equality.
VI CONCLUSION
SouthAfrica has emerged from a particularly ugly history, characterised by
systemic discrimination including religious and cultural discrimination,
which was directed mainly at communities that suffered racial discrimina-
tion. There was therefore a direct link between racial discrimination and
religious and cultural discrimination. Consequently, the adoption of a
Constitution that not only prohibits unfair discrimination on the basis of
race166 but also promotes tolerance and respect for religious and cultural
diversity167 signalled a significant achievement for those who had
struggled against the racist laws of the apartheid regime.
The enactment of the RCMA and the steps taken to draft legislation to
afford recognition to Muslim marriages demonstrates the ANC-led
government’s commitment to grant equal respect to different marriage
systems. The manner in which the RCMA was drafted also indicates an
166 Section 9(3).
167 South African Constitution, ss 15, 30 and 31.
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intention to promote equality between spouses. However, in attempting
to achieve this aim, the legislature adopted a misguided approach,
involving the direct injection of rules from the civil model of marriage
into African customary marriages. Although the civil law rules relating to
marriage advance formal equality, in the context of African customary
marriages they do not always result in substantive equality. This is then a
manifestation of assimilation gone wrong. So, when considering the
adoption of assimilation techniques for drafting legislation to recognise
different types of marriages, including Muslim marriages, this paper
illustrates that it is imperative to determine the potential impact that those
techniques could have on communities targeted by the legislation.
The paper also demonstrates that impact cannot be considered in
isolation of context. The context of targeted communities is essential to
determine what is required to ensure that the legislation will have its
desired effect and that it will be optimally utilised by its intended
beneficiaries. In the context of African indigenous communities, the oral
tradition of living customary law facilitates a dynamism that enables
customary law to be shaped in accordance with the changing socio-
economic conditions of the communities. Similarly, the inherent poten-
tial for Islamic law to develop in a manner that is responsive to the needs
of Muslim communities requires the utilisation of sources that are not
only text-based. Therefore, in order for legislation to be responsive to the
needs of communities, it must integrate mechanisms and methodologies
inherent to the religious and cultural traditions that can aid the develop-
ment of religious and cultural laws in a socially responsive manner.
It appears then that the most important insight that surfaces from the
comparative study is that there is no one-size-fits-all solution for the
recognition of different types of religious and cultural marriages. Which-
ever approach is adopted to recognise Muslim marriages (or any other
religious and cultural marriage) must be context-driven and impact-
focused. With regard to the latter, the potential impact that legislation
could have for marginalised members of a religious and cultural commu-
nity who are in need of the most protection must receive particular
consideration. In the case of Muslim marriages, this would be women and
children. In this way, legislation recognising Muslim marriages can ensure
the advancement of constitutional rights and norms.
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